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Investors can benefit when incorporating the information-signalling effect of share repurchases in their investment 
strategies. Previous South African studies on open market share repurchases confirmed the globally observed signalling-
effect, but found open market share repurchases not to be the outright favoured share repurchase type in this country – as 
is the case globally. The present study is the first to examine the market reaction to the preferred share repurchase type, 
namely specific (or tender and private offers) share repurchases, in the South African regulatory environment. Abnormal 
returns were calculated using a 12-parameter benchmark over a four-year event window, for share repurchases announced 
from 1999 to 2009. Pro rata tender offers were found not to possess information-signalling benefits, but significant excess 
returns subsequent to the announcement date were reported for the two private offer types (namely other specific offers 
and the repurchase by the holding company of shares held by subsidiaries). The other specific offers were found to possess 
significant information-signalling benefits – especially over the long term and in respect of value companies. 
 
Introduction 
 
The explanation most commonly offered in literature for the 
repurchasing of shares is that managers use this action to 
signal to the market their optimism about their company’s 
prospects. Positive abnormal returns subsequent to a share 
repurchase announcement are well documented and support 
the information-signalling theory (Ikenberry, Lakonishok, & 
Vermaelen, 1995; Manconi, Peyer, & Vermaelen, 2013; 
Peyer & Vermaelen, 2007; Yook, 2010). Investment 
strategies based on the benefits to be derived from the 
information-signalling effect of share repurchases, however, 
need to incorporate the windows of opportunity and the 
different types of share repurchases involved. 
 
There are essentially three types of share repurchases: open 
market, tender offers and private offers. The open market 
share repurchase is the globally preferred method – 
representing more than 90% of share repurchase value in the 
United States of America (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) 
(Banyi, Dyl, & Kahle, 2008: 460; Fairchild & Zang, 2005; 
Grullon & Michaely, 2004: 651). The preference for open 
market share repurchases explains the global research focus 
on this type of share repurchase. 
 
The US has recorded the highest share repurchase activity to 
date when compared to other countries, with the UK and 
Japan showing the next highest (Kim, Schremper, & Varaiya, 
2004: 5; Manconi et al., 2013;  Stonham, 2002: 37; Van 
Rixtel & Villegas, 2015).  Although non-US companies 
generally follow the same market reaction patterns as 
documented in US research, it is expected that cross-country 
differences in the quality of corporate governance and 
regulatory differences may lead to variations in reported 
abnormal returns subsequent to share repurchase 
announcements (Manconi et al., 2013). 
 
In South Africa, share repurchases were allowed as from 1 
July 1999. South African share repurchase activity has not yet 
reached the levels of US share repurchases, but a strong 
increase in share repurchase activity since 2005 has been 
observed (Wesson, Bruwer, & Hamman, 2015). The unique 
South African regulatory environment has, however, resulted 
in the open market share repurchase type not being the 
favoured approach for companies listed on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange Ltd (JSE). Only about 43% of South African 
share repurchase value is executed through the open market 
and, owing to the 3% announcement rule of the JSE Listings 
Requirements, only about 59% of the open market share 
repurchase value is announced via the Security Exchange 
News Service (SENS) (Wesson et al., 2015). South African 
studies on the market reaction to open market share 
repurchase announcements by JSE-listed companies found 
support for the information-signalling theory (Bhana, 2007; 
Pienaar & Krige, 2012; Wesson, Muller, & Ward, 2014).  
 
In South Africa there are essentially one tender offer type 
(namely pro rata offers) and two types of private offers 
(namely other specific offers and the repurchase by the 
holding company of shares held by subsidiaries) (Bester, 
Wesson, & Hamman, 2010). South African studies have not 
yet addressed the information-signalling effect of tender and 
private offer share repurchase announcements by JSE-listed 
companies. 
 
The present study is the first South African study on the 
market reaction to tender and private offers by JSE-listed 
companies. The results of this study will better equip market 
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participants in deciding whether and when to act in response 
to a JSE-listed company’s announcement to repurchase 
shares via the preferred South African share repurchase 
method.  
 
Literature review 
 
A company’s managers are better informed than outside 
shareholders about the true value of the company, and this 
information asymmetry may lead to companies being priced 
below their intrinsic value. Share repurchase plans therefore 
convey a credible sign from management that company 
shares are undervalued (Miller & Rock, 1985). The 
information-signalling potential of a share repurchase 
announcement, however, depends on the type of share 
repurchase involved. Open market share repurchase 
announcements are non-committal, as opposed to tender 
offers and private offers, which generally need to be executed 
once the terms of the arrangement have been agreed on 
(Bester, et al., 2010). Literature therefore generally reports 
higher initial (or short-term) market reactions to share 
repurchase types where the announcement represents a firm 
commitment to repurchase (Yook, 2010). Ikenberry et al. 
(1995) developed the underreaction theory which postulates 
that the market treats the initial announcement, especially in 
respect of open market share repurchases, with scepticism; 
and it is mainly over the long term, and in particular for value 
shares (undervalued shares), that the excess return is 
observed. The information-signalling theory therefore entails 
two elements: the short-term effect (or traditional signalling 
theory) and the long-term effect (or underreaction theory).  
 
Different terminologies are used in different jurisdictions 
when referring to the three generally accepted share 
repurchase types (namely open market, tender offers and 
private offers). The open market repurchase type, for 
instance, refers to the ‘on-market’ repurchase in some 
jurisdictions, and in South Africa it refers to the ‘general 
repurchase’. The tender offer type is called the ‘equal access 
repurchase’ in some jurisdictions, and in many jurisdictions 
there are different categories of tender offers, depending on 
the nature of these offers. In the US there are essentially two 
types of tender offers: the fixed price tender offer and the 
Dutch auction tender offer. The pro rata offer is a variation of 
the fixed price tender offer in the US. In South Africa all share 
repurchases not classified as general (or open market) 
repurchases are referred to as ‘specific repurchases’. Specific 
repurchases are then, according to their nature, either 
classified as pro rata offers or other specific offers. South 
African pro rata offers are similar in style to US pro rata fixed 
price tender offers, and South African other specific offers are 
similar to private (or direct) offers (Bester et al., 2010: 48). 
 
Open market share repurchases 
 
US open market share repurchase announcements are 
generally accompanied by positive returns of about 3% and 
long-term abnormal returns in the order of 30% over the 
subsequent three to four years (Ikenberry et al., 1995; 
Manconi et al., 2013; Peyer & Vermaelen, 2007). Non-US 
open market short-term returns are generally only about half 
the value of those in the US; whereas long-term returns 
generally follow the same pattern as reported in US research 
(Manconi et al., 2013).  
 
Although South African studies on the information-signalling 
hypothesis on announced open market share repurchases 
conducted by Bhana (2007), Pienaar and Krige (2012) and 
Wesson et al. (2014) confirmed the information-signalling 
theory, the results of these studies differed. Bhana (2007), 
who covered the period October 2000 to March 2003 in which 
117 repurchase announcements were made, reported an initial 
abnormal return between t-2 and t2 of 4,38%; a long-term 
three-year abnormal return of 14,35%; and, for value shares, 
a 32,8% long-term three-year abnormal return. Pienaar and 
Krige (2012) covered the period October 2000 to December 
2007 in which 113 announcements were made by 63 
companies, and confirmed the results of Bhana (2007) with a 
long-term three-year abnormal return of 26,57% for non-
resource companies. Pienaar and Krige (2012) did not 
observe a conclusive result on value versus growth shares. 
Wesson et al. (2014) covered the period July 1999 to 
December 2009 in which 195 open market share repurchase 
announcements were made by non-resource and non-
financial companies. The study found abnormal returns of 
about -1% prior to the announcement; a small increase of 
about 1% surrounding the event itself (from t-3 to t3); and a 
maximum outperformance of about 35% on t550 (about two 
years subsequent to the announcement). The outperformance 
was almost entirely confined to the value portfolio, reaching 
a maximum of about 80% by t600 (about two-and-a-half years 
subsequent to the announcement). The Wesson et al. (2014: 
59) study applied a more robust research methodology 
compared to previous South African research, through using 
an improved dataset and extending the research period – and 
reported much higher abnormal returns when compared to 
global studies. 
 
Tender offers 
 
Tender offers usually entail offers made to existing 
shareholders in terms of a fixed price or Dutch auction tender 
offer. Fixed price tender offers and Dutch auction tender 
offers differ in the way they are structured: fixed price tender 
offers involve the repurchase of a pre-determined number of 
shares from shareholders based on a premium to current 
market prices, whereas Dutch auction tender offers are based 
on the company stating the predetermined number of shares 
it wants to repurchase and the price range to be considered.  
The purchase price is then solicited from shareholders and 
determined on the basis of the lowest price necessary to 
acquire the intended number of shares (this price being 
extended to all the buyback shareholders). The premium 
offered on fixed price tender offers is generally higher than 
the premium on Dutch auction tender offers (Comment & 
Jarrel, 1991: 1257). Tender offers consistently outperform 
open market share repurchases over the short- and long-term 
(Vermaelen, 1981; Yook, 2010). Tender offers are viewed as 
a credible signal of undervaluation owing to the binding 
commitment to repurchase; the greater rand value involved 
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(when compared to open market repurchases); the lower 
frequency of tender offer programmes (when compared to 
open market repurchase programmes); and also the fact that 
managers often pre-commit not to offer their shares (Ofer & 
Thakor, 1987; Vafeas, 1997; Yook, 2010). Fixed price tender 
offers generally outperform Dutch auction tender offers, this 
being mainly attributable to the larger premium (when 
compared to Dutch auction tender offers) involved (Comment 
& Jarrel, 1991).  
 
The pro rata offer, a variation of the fixed price tender offer, 
offers current shareholders shares in proportion to their 
shareholding. Bagwell (1992) distinguished between pro rata 
and non-pro rata offers, by finding that it was only for non-
pro rata offers that positive share returns were observed. Pro 
rata offers showed a price decline at expiry (exercise) date 
that offset the initial announcement effect – which could be 
explained by the marginal shareholder being unchanged 
subsequent to the pro rata offer (Bagwell, 1992: 88). 
 
Private offers 
 
Private (or direct) offers are privately negotiated repurchases 
from large shareholders. When a large block of shareholders 
wants to sell its shareholding in the market, the intended sale 
may negatively affect the share price and management may 
therefore decide to repurchase these shares directly from the 
shareholders. The price negotiated for the repurchase is 
generally lower than the market price. Private offers are 
seldom included in global studies, mainly because limited 
data are available (Vermaelen, 1981: 143). The motivation 
for private offers is, however, not generally associated with 
signalling undervaluation to the market. 
 
In South Africa there are two private (other specific) offer 
types, namely: the repurchase by the holding company of 
shares held by subsidiaries, and other specific (or private) 
offers. The repurchase by the holding company of shares held 
by subsidiaries is a private offer which, owing to the unique 
characteristics thereof, should be categorised as a separate 
private offer category in the South African regulatory 
environment (Bester et al., 2010: 50). In South Africa, 
subsidiaries are allowed to repurchase up to 10% of the shares 
in their holding company (RSA, 2008), and the shares 
repurchased by subsidiaries represent treasury shares in the 
South African regulatory environment. Most countries do not 
allow subsidiaries to repurchase shares in the holding 
company and, combined with the fact that share repurchases 
by the holding company are not cancelled from the issued 
share capital in these countries, the repurchase by the holding 
company of shares held by subsidiaries therefore does not 
occur in these countries (Bester et al., 2010: 49). Companies 
may decide to repurchase shares through subsidiaries for 
various business reasons. The decision to then repurchase the 
shares held by the subsidiaries may, for instance, have been 
because the business reason that motivated the purchase by 
the subsidiary was no longer applicable (Wesson & Hamman, 
2012: 37). A study covering the period 1999 to 2009 reported 
that companies repurchasing the shares held by subsidiaries 
most commonly state the reason for the repurchase as being 
that the 10% limit has nearly been reached and, by 
repurchasing these shares from the subsidiaries, this would 
make way for new repurchases by the subsidiaries (Wesson 
& Hamman, 2012). Although there was an income tax 
advantage for companies when repurchasing shares through 
subsidiaries – in the target period of the Wesson and Hamman 
(2012) study – and also when companies subsequently – in 
periods prior to 1 October 2007 – repurchased shares held by 
subsidiaries, it was found that companies seldom declared 
contentious issues (Chivaka, Siddle, Banye, Cairney, & Shev, 
2009). Secondary tax on companies (STC) was applicable to 
dividend and share repurchases for periods prior to 1 April 
2012, after which legislation was amended to introduce a 
shareholder tax principle (which is generally applied in other 
jurisdictions).  
 
When comparing the three specific share repurchase types in 
South Africa (namely the pro rata offer, and the two private 
offers), it was found that, for reporting periods from 1999 to 
2009, the repurchase by the holding company of the shares 
held by subsidiaries was the favoured specific share 
repurchase type (representing about 55% of total specific 
repurchase value), while pro rata offers and other specific 
offers represented about 32% and 13% of the total specific 
repurchase value, respectively (Wesson et al., 2015). The fact 
that subsidiaries are allowed to repurchase shares in their 
holding company has therefore affected share repurchase 
behaviour in the South African regulatory environment: the 
open market share repurchase type is not the favoured share 
repurchase type, and the repurchase by the holding company 
of shares held by subsidiaries represents about 31% of total 
share repurchase value – hence resulting in specific 
repurchases being the favoured share repurchase method 
(Wesson et al., 2015).   
 
In the present study it needs to be ascertained whether the 
market reacts differently to the South African tender and 
private offer share repurchase types, and whether these 
reactions differ from the information-signalling effects 
reported in comparable global studies on different share 
repurchase types.  
 
Data and methodology    
 
Population and sample 
 
The population for this study consisted of all companies listed 
on the main board of the JSE during the financial periods 1 
July 1999 to the 2009 year-ends of the companies, but 
excluding the Basic Materials and Financials sectors. The JSE 
had to be the primary listing of the companies and a listing 
period of at least three years during the target period was 
required for the companies to be included in the population.  
The share repurchases in respect of listed ordinary and/or N-
shares of the companies were included in the dataset. Odd lot 
offers and share trust repurchases were excluded from the 
sample, because odd lots have been allowed prior to 1999 and 
because the share trust repurchases are not treated as share 
repurchases in terms of the JSE Listings Requirements.  
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The total population comprised 227 companies of which 55 
companies made a total of 81 announcements in respect of the 
following tender and private offers during the target period: 
15 pro rata offer announcements; 28 announcements on the 
repurchase by the holding company of shares held by 
subsidiaries; and 38 other specific offers. Appendix 1 lists the 
number of announcements per share repurchase type per 
company, and the total value for each share repurchase type. 
 
Data collection 
 
Data on share repurchase announcements were captured from 
SENS announcements of the JSE, as obtained from the Inet 
BFA database (product called News). Each company in the 
defined population of this study was individually searched 
using the keywords ’repurchase’, ’buy-back’, ’buy back’, 
’buyback’ and ’treasury’. Each keyword needed to be 
searched separately, owing to the configuration of the Inet 
BFA database. Each SENS announcement was then captured 
(specifically noting the date of the announcement, number of 
shares repurchased and type of repurchase). The SENS 
announcements for each company were then reconciled with 
the annual report disclosures on share repurchases to ensure 
that announcements actually resulted in repurchases, and 
cumulative announcements were adjusted to exclude 
previously announced repurchases. The rand amounts of the 
repurchases were obtained from the annual report disclosures 
(especially the directors’ reports, statements of changes in 
equity, and share capital notes) and/or SENS announcements. 
The methodology applied in the Wesson et al. (2015) study 
was also applied in this study to obtain share repurchase data 
from annual reports. 
 
The definition of the event date for the purpose of this study 
relates to the JSE Listings Requirements, as stipulated in 
Sections 11.25 (JSE, 2007). Specific repurchases need to be 
announced once the terms of the arrangement have been 
agreed upon. The event date for all specific (tender and 
private) share repurchase types therefore reflected the date on 
which the intention to repurchase was announced, provided 
that the number of shares sought was included in the SENS 
announcement.  
 
Research methodology 
 
This study aimed to examine the effects that companies’ share 
repurchase announcements of tender and private offers had 
on the share prices of these companies. An event study 
methodology was applied to test the short- and long-term 
market reaction subsequent to share repurchase 
announcements. A standard methodology for event studies 
has been established over time (Bhana, 1998; Bowman, 1983; 
Brown & Warner, 1980; Madura & Akhigbe, 1995) and was, 
broadly, also applied in this study – as discussed below.  
 
The event date was defined as the first announcement date of 
the repurchase type, and this was denoted as t0. A four-year 
event window was defined as 60 trading days prior to the 
event date to 1000 trading days after the event date and 
denoted as t-60 to t1 000.  
An important consideration for event studies, and particularly 
those with long event windows, is the choice of benchmark 
against which abnormal returns are estimated (Lyon, Barber, 
& Tsai, 1999: 165). Different benchmarks have been used in 
other studies, for example a standard market model (Kaul, 
Mehrotra, & Morck, 2000; Chen, Noronha, & Singal, 2004; 
Shankar & Miller, 2006) and a capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM) (Amihud & Mendelson, 1986; Elliot, Van Ness, 
Walker, & Wan, 2006; Shankar & Miller, 2006). These 
benchmarks have been shown to be inadequate – the CAPM, 
in particular, fails to account for expected returns on the basis 
of company size, as well as growth versus value (Fama & 
French, 1992; 1993; 1995; 1996; 1998) and resource versus 
non-resource shares – which is relevant especially in the 
South African context (Van Rensburg 2001; Van Rensburg & 
Robertson 2003a, 2003b). A 12-parameter-style model to 
estimate benchmark returns was therefore used in this study. 
Following Mordant and Muller (2003), Mutooni and Muller 
(2007), and Ward and Muller (2010), 12 control portfolios of 
shares representing the cross-sectional factors of size (based 
on market capitalisation), growth/value (based on P/E ratios), 
and resources/non-resources were constructed, and betas for 
each share in the sample were estimated against these. The 
control portfolios were rebalanced for every quarter to ensure 
that changes in share characteristics (market capitalisation, 
P/E ratios, new listings and delistings, etc.) were closely 
tracked over time. Delisted shares were included up to the 
delisting date, after which the share price returns of the 
delisted companies were assumed to be zero until the end of 
the quarter. The delisted shares were excluded from the 
following quarter’s rebalancing of control portfolios. 
Similarly, the share price returns of newly listed shares were 
included in the following quarter, when the control portfolios 
were rebalanced. Abnormal returns (ARs) for each share 
could then be estimated using the multiple regression 
equation described in Ward and Muller (2010) and Wesson et 
al. (2014). The performance was calculated over an extended 
period by accumulating the average ARs to obtain the 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for each share, over the 
event window period.  
 
Owing to the non-normal return distributions generally 
associated with event studies, a non-parametric test to 
measure significance is appropriate (Ward & Muller, 2010). 
In the present study a bootstrapping process was used to test 
ARs and CARs for significance (Noreen, 1989). Using the 
daily ARs for each of the shares in the sample, Monte Carlo-
type bootstrap distributions of CARs were constructed. This 
was done by selecting random dates, for each company, from 
the period before and after the actual event date (excluding 
the observations in the event window itself) and calculating 
the CARs. The random date generation process was repeated 
200 times to generate a suite of distributions for the event 
window. From this data, significance levels were determined 
for -60-day CARs, -10-day CARs, 10-day CARs, 20-day 
CARs, 60-day CARs and 550-day CARs.  
 
Although event studies typically focus on relatively short 
time periods, Ward and Muller (2010) argue that the use of a 
more sophisticated model to estimate the ARs is significantly 
superior to the conventional CAPM or market models, in that 
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the 12 control portfolios take account of so-called style 
effects, including the size and value effects and the 
resources/non-resources dimension, known to be present on 
the JSE. Furthermore, the methodology of this study of 
constructing a bootstrap distribution of CARs across the full 
time-series, allowed the researchers to perform suitable 
significance tests for the hypotheses of this study. 
 
Research limitations 
 
A limitation in this research was the small number of events 
available for analysis. These events, however, comprise the 
total population for the target period of this study. 
 
The long horizon event window extends to 1000 trading days 
after the effective date, however standard error limits 
conclusions about whether the price change is temporary or 
permanent. 
 
Results 
 
Review of the data 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the 81 share 
repurchase announcements which were made in respect of 
tender and private offers during the target period (i.e. 1999 to 
2009). A small number of share repurchase announcements 
contributed to total tender offer and private offer share 
repurchase value.  
 
Although the number of share repurchase announcements in 
respect of other specific offers (n=38) was higher than the 
number of announcements in respect of the repurchase by the 
holding company of shares held by subsidiaries (n=28), the 
repurchase by the holding company of shares held by 
subsidiaries category contributed to the majority (about 51%) 
of the combined share repurchase value for total tender and 
private offers, as observed in Appendix 1. 
 
From Table 1 it is evident that larger companies, which were 
less undervalued, tended to announce large repurchases via 
the private offer type called the repurchase by the holding 
company of shares held by subsidiaries. 
 
Table 1:  Descriptive statistics on tender and private offer share repurchase announcements  
 
Event 
type 
Number of 
observations 
Average market 
capitalisation 
Maximum market 
capitalisation 
Minimum market 
capitalisation 
Median based 
on P/E ratio 
(Rm) (Rm) (Rm) 
Tender offer:  
Pro rata  15 8026 39211 83 9,8 
Private offer: 
Repurchase by holding 
company of shares held by 
subsidiaries 28 19903 188534 23 11,4 
Private offer: 
Other specific  38 7297 186595 8 9,2 
Total 81         
To ensure that the results were not affected by spurious 
outliers, the abnormal returns were trimmed so as to exclude 
any daily ARs greater than 20% or less than -20%. Initially, 
the CARs for the full sample of events were examined across 
the event window from t-60 to t1 000, applying different weights 
to each observation: firstly equal weights; secondly weighted 
by the value of the share repurchase as a percentage of market 
capitalisation; and thirdly weighted by the value of the share 
repurchase as a percentage of market capitalisation, but with 
a maximum of 50% weight for any observation. Figure 1 
shows that, in general, the CARs were similar, irrespective of 
the weighting methodology. For the data weighted by the 
value of the repurchase as a percentage of market 
capitalisation, there was evidence of influence by outliers, 
particularly in the first 100 days of the event window. The 
equal-weighted CARs were smoother and the equal weights 
were therefore used in the subsequent analysis.  
 
 
 
Figure 1:  CARs for tender and private offer share 
repurchase announcements, with different weights 
applied to observations 
 
Significance testing 
 
In Table 2 the significance test results for all share repurchase 
types are shown, at various intervals prior and subsequent to 
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the event date. The first two rows of Table 2 show the average 
ARs and standard error of the ARs per repurchase category, 
while row three represents the actual CARs of the 
observations of the study. The fourth row represents the p 
value results from the Monte Carlo-type bootstrapping 
process. Figures in shaded blocks indicate the actual CARs 
which were significant (based on p values) at the 1, 5 and 10% 
level when compared to the suite of distributions generated in 
the Monte Carlo-type bootstrapping process. 
 
The CARs of all tender and private offers were significant at 
t760. At t60 the CARs of all private offer share repurchase types 
were significant. Around the event date, at t1 and t2, the CARs 
for pro rata offers were significant; and for t2 the CARs for 
the repurchase by the holding company of shares held by 
subsidiaries were significant. It was only in respect of other 
specific offers that pre-announcement CARs, namely at t -60, 
were significant. 
 
The observed results of this study pertaining to the long-term 
market reaction (or underreaction) subsequent to the 
announcement in respect of all tender and private offer types 
can therefore be reported as being significant (at the 5% level 
– except for pro rata offers which were significant at the 1% 
level). The short-term market reaction around the event date 
of pro rata offers and the repurchase by the holding company 
of shares held by subsidiaries was significant on t2 at the 5% 
and 1% level respectively, and on t60 a significance level of 
5% was reported for the the repurchase by the holding 
company of shares held by subsidiaries. 
 
 
Table 2:  ARs, CARs and significance test results from the Monte Carlo bootstrap distributions 
 
Category  t-60 t-2 t-1 t0 t1 t2 t60 t760 
 Average AR (%)   -1,23    0,05   -0,43    1,15    1,05    0,35   -0,91   -1,27 
Tender offer: 
Pro rata  Standard error of AR (%)    1,40    0,48    0,72    1,12    0,95    0,55    0,62    0,50 
 Actual CAR (%)    0,02   -0,05    0,00    1,16 2,22** 2,58**    3,24 -23,57*** 
 P value of CAR    0,31    0,49     0,14    0,04    0,04    0,47    0,00 
Private offer: 
Repurchase by 
holding 
company of 
shares held by 
subsidiaries  
Average AR (%)   -0,70   -0,18    0,53    0,27   -0,41   -0,13    0,02    1,12 
Standard error of AR (%)    0,74    0,57    0,59    0,85    0,67    0,37    0,61    0,51 
Actual CAR (%)   -2,59    0,36    0,00    0,28   -0,14 
-
0,28*** -1,22** 15,38** 
P value of CAR    0,28    0,27     0,31    0,35    0,00    0,03    0,03 
Private offer: 
Other specific  
Average AR (%)    0,45    0,63   -0,67   -0,54    0,82    0,90    0,26   -0,22 
Standard error of AR (%)    0,83    0,65    0,59    0,92    0,74    0,63    0,58    0,34 
Actual CAR (%) -16,87***   -0,63    0,00   -0,54    0,26    1,16   -1,13* 34,58** 
 P value of CAR    0,00    0,13     0,19    0,32    0,20    0,09     0,01 
*** p value less than 0,0 
**   p value less than 0,05  
*    p value less than 0,10 
Discussion of results 
 
Short-term returns  
 
In Figure 2 the event window was reduced to t-60 until t60 to 
be able to observe the movement around the event date t0 in 
detail. The only significant excess returns reported 
subsequent to the event were in respect of pro rata offers. 
These excess returns were relatively small (between 2% and 
3%) and were limited to the two days subsequent to the 
announcement date.  
 
Figure 2 also indicates that the market was not efficient. The 
bulk of the abnormal returns occurred before t0. The event 
(announcement) therefore conveyed very little new 
information to the market, which appears to have anticipated 
the announcement of the event. 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Short-term CARs for tender and private offer 
share repurchase types 
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Long-term returns  
 
As stated above, the same methodology was applied in the 
short- and long-term event studies. The results of Figure 3 
therefore include the same results as reported in Figure 2, but 
over a longer event window. 
 
Figure 3 shows that the CARs on pro rata offers were negative 
for most of the post-announcement period and stabilised at 
about -28% on t780. The repurchase by the holding company 
of shares held by subsidiaries showed CARs of 
approximately zero until t440, after which CARs gradually 
increase to about 10% on t560 (about two-and-a-quarter years 
subsequent to the announcement), and to about 30% at t960 
(about four years subsequent to the announcement). Other 
specific offers showed a steady increase as from t0 to about 
30% at about t480 (about two years subsequent to the 
announcement), before stabilising. 
 
The two private offer types (namely other specific offers, and 
the the repurchase by the holding company of shares held by 
subsidiaries) showed excess returns based on the 
underreaction theory (i.e. over the long term), whereas their 
short-term returns were negative. In respect of the pro rata 
tender offer type, the short-term excess return evident after 
the event date was offset after the event date at about t440 and 
an underperformance against the market was reported over 
the long term. 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  CARs for tender and private offer share 
repurchase types 
 
As the CARs were generally stable after about three years 
(approximately 760 trading days), the post-event window was 
reduced to 760 days for the remainder of the analysis. It was 
only in respect of the repurchase by the holding company of 
shares held by subsidiaries category where an increase from 
about 15% to about 30% was observed over the remainder of 
the event window. 
 
Value versus growth 
 
Figure 4 shows that in respect of pro rata offers and other 
specific offers the value companies (namely companies with 
P/E ratios lower than the median P/E) outperformed the 
growth companies (namely companies with P/E ratios higher 
than the median P/E). The highest CARs values were 
observed for value companies conducting other specific 
offers (reaching a maximum value of about 40% at about t560, 
or about two-and-a-quarter years subsequent to the 
announcement, and then stabilising at that level thereafter). 
Value companies entering into pro rata offers showed 
positive CARs (fluctuating between 0% and 20%) until about 
t550, after which CARs decreased to about -10% at about t660, 
and subsequently increased to about -5%. 
 
It was only for the repurchase by the holding company of 
shares held by subsidiaries (treasury shares) that the value 
companies did not outperform the growth companies – with 
value companies showing negative CARs till about t580, 
whereafter an outperformance of about 10% was observed; 
and growth companies showing excess returns of about 0% 
till about t300, after which CARs gradually increased to around 
10%.  
 
Even the growth portfolios for the private offer types (namely 
other specific offers and the repurchase by the holding 
company of shares held by subsidiaries) showed positive 
CARs, but at lower levels than the reported CARs for value 
portfolios. 
 
 
 
Figure 4:  CARs for tender and private offer share 
repurchase types based on value and growth portfolios 
 
Comparison to global research on different share 
repurchase types 
 
The results reported in this study are consistent with the 
global results on the signalling effect of pro rata offers: the 
initial positive market reaction was offset over the long term. 
In this study only a small window of opportunity existed 
around the announcement date (on t1 and t2), but the observed 
excess return was only between 2% and 3%. Value companies 
announcing pro rata offers did show CARs fluctuating 
between 0% and 20% until about t550, whereafter negative 
CARs were reported. Any planned investment decision based 
on announced pro rata offers would need to be timed correctly 
to benefit from the brief (and relatively small) windows of 
opportunity and, even then, transaction costs and market 
impact factors would diminish the effect of this strategy.   
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Global evidence is not available on the information-signalling 
effect of the two private offer types (namely other specific 
offers and the repurchase by the holding company of shares 
held by subsidiaries) covered in this study. It was, however, 
expected that private offers in general are not executed to 
signal undervaluation to the market and hence would not 
show a significant signalling effect. This study did, however, 
report significant excess returns on both South African 
private offer types over the long term.  
 
The other specific offer type showed excess returns of about 
30% as from about t480 (or about two years subsequent to the 
announcement date). When distinguishing between value and 
growth companies, it was found that excess returns were 
mainly attributable to value companies, reaching a maximum 
of about 40% on about t560 (or about two-and-a-quarter years 
subsequent to the announcement date) and the stabilising at 
that level thereafter. Growth companies only showed excess 
returns of about 10% as from about t380. Investors will 
therefore benefit when investing in companies announcing 
other specific offers – especially if these companies are 
undervalued.   
 
The repurchase by the holding company of shares held by 
subsidiaries type showed excess returns of about 15% at 
about t760 (or about three years subsequent to the 
announcement date), increasing to about 30% at about four 
years subsequent to the announcement date. When 
distinguishing between value and growth companies, it was 
however found that value companies did not outperform the 
growth companies: value companies showed negative returns 
during most of the period and the maximum outperformance 
for both value and growth companies was around 10% as 
from about t580. The motivation for companies repurchasing 
shares held by their subsidiaries therefore does not seem to be 
the signalling of undervaluation. Investment decisions based 
on the information-signalling effect of announcements on the 
repurchase of shares held by subsidiaries will therefore not 
provide significant long-term benefits – especially if invested 
in value companies. 
 
When comparing the results of this study to the reported 
information-signalling effect on open market share 
repurchases, it was found that the returns on South African 
private offers are lower than the maximum returns generally 
reported in respect of open market share repurchases. The 
most recent South African event study on open market share 
repurchases (Wesson et al., 2014) reported maximum excess 
returns of about 35% at about two years subsequent to the 
announcement date, and value portfolios reaching a 
maximum of about 80% at about two-and-a-half years 
subsequent to the announcement.  
 
The important finding to be made is that not all South African 
share repurchase announcements convey information-
signalling benefits. Open market share repurchase 
announcements and the announcements on one private offer 
type (namely other specific offers) are followed by long-term 
excess returns – especially in respect of value portfolios. 
Information-signalling does not seem to be the motivation for 
the pro rata tender offer type and the repurchases by the 
holding company of shares held by subsidiaries private offer 
type. Investment decisions based on the signalling effect of 
share repurchase announcements therefore need to take 
cognisance of the regulatory environment in which the 
announcement was made.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Open market share repurchase announcements are generally 
associated with observed maximum excess returns reported 
at about three to four years subsequent to the announcement 
date. Globally the open market share repurchase type is the 
favourite share repurchase method, with the other two share 
repurchase types (namely tender offers and private offers) 
representing only about 10% of total share repurchase value. 
It is, however, accepted that regulatory differences between 
countries may explain differences in share repurchase 
behaviour across countries. 
 
In South Africa the open market share repurchase type is not 
the favourite share repurchase method, representing only 
about 43% of total share repurchase value. Previous South 
African research on the market reaction to open market share 
repurchases has confirmed the signalling theory, reporting 
maximum excess returns at about three years subsequent to 
the share repurchase announcement – with value portfolios 
outperforming growth portfolios. The present study is the first 
South African study on the market reaction to announcements 
of tender and private offers by JSE-listed companies. 
 
This study applied a robust research method (by following an 
event study methodology over a four-year event window, 
using a 12-parameter benchmark) to test the market reaction 
to announcements of the South African tender offer (pro rata 
offer) type and the two South African private offer types 
(namely other specific offers and the repurchase by the 
holding company of shares held by subsidiaries) of non-
financial and non-resource JSE-listed companies over the 
reporting periods covering the period 1999 to 2009. The 
repurchase by the holding company of shares held by 
subsidiaries type is unique to the South African regulatory 
environment – and represents about 31% of total share 
repurchase value in this country.  
 
The pro rata offer type has, consistently with global results, 
not shown long-term excess returns subsequent to 
announcement date. The observed results on the two private 
offer types differed: other specific offers showed higher 
excess returns (reaching a maximum of about 30% 
approximately two years subsequent to the announcement, 
and then stabilising at that level thereafter) than the 
repurchase by the holding company of shares held by the 
subsidiaries type; while value portfolios outperformed 
growth portfolios in respect of other specific offers (reaching 
a maximum of about 40% at approximately two-and-a-
quarter years subsequent to the announcement, and then 
stabilising at that level thereafter), but not in respect of the 
repurchase by the holding company of shares held by 
subsidiaries type. It was concluded that only the 
announcements on other specific offers were credible signals 
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of undervaluation. When compared to the excess returns 
reported in South African research on open market share 
repurchase announcements, lower excess returns were 
observed for private offers.  
 
The results of this study highlight that regulatory differences 
between countries need to be considered when evaluating the 
information-signalling effect of share repurchase 
announcements. In the South African regulatory 
environment, investors can benefit when investing in 
companies that have announced open market share 
repurchases, as well as other specific offers – and these 
benefits are more prevalent over the long term and when 
investing in value companies. 
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Appendix 1:  Companies conducting tender and private offers 
 
No. Company name 
Tender offer: Pro 
rata 
Private offer: Repurchase by the holding 
company of shares held by subsidiaries 
Private offer: Other 
specific 
No. of 
announcements No. of announcements No. of announcements 
1 Adcorp Holdings Ltd  1  
2 Allied Electronics Corporation Ltd 1   
3 Allied Technologies Ltd   1 
4 Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd   2 
5 Aveng Ltd 1   
6 AVI Ltd 1 1  
7 Barloworld Ltd  1  
8 Brandcorp Holdings Ltd   1 
9 Chester Investment Holdings Ltd   1 
10 Clicks Group Ltd  3  
11 Compu-Clearing Outsourcing Ltd  1  
12 Connection Group Holdings Ltd  1  
13 Control Instruments Group Ltd  1 2 
14 Digicore Holdings Ltd 1   
15 Distribution and Warehousing Network Ltd   1 
16 DNA Supply Chain Investments Ltd   1 
17 Electronic Media Network Ltd   1 
18 Global Village Holdings Ltd   1 
19 Gold Reef Resorts Ltd 1   
20 Grindrod Ltd  2 1 
21 Grintek Ltd 1   
22 Heritage Collection Holdings Ltd   1 
23 Imperial Holdings Ltd 1   
24 Invicta Ltd   1 
25 Kairos Industrial Holdings Ltd 1   
26 LA Group Ltd   2 
27 Metrofile Holdings Ltd  1  
28 MICROmega Holdings Ltd   1 
29 MTN Group Ltd   1 
30 Murray & Roberts Holdings Ltd   1 
31 Mustek Ltd 1   
32 Netcare Ltd  2 3 
33 Oceana Group Ltd   2 
34 Ozz Ltd   1 
35 Paracon Holdings Ltd  1 3 
36 Pick n Pay Stores Ltd  1 1 
37 Primeserv Group Ltd  1  
38 Prism Holdings Ltd 1   
39 Remgro Ltd  1  
40 Reunert Ltd 1 1  
41 Sasol Ltd  2  
42 Seardel Investment Corporation Ltd   1 
43 Set Point Ltd   1 
44 Shoprite Holdings Ltd   1 
45 Spur Corporation Ltd   1 
46 Sun International Ltd 1   
47 The Bidvest Group Ltd 1  1 
48 The House of Busby Ltd  1  
49 Tiger Wheels Ltd  1  
50 Transpaco Ltd 1 1 1 
51 Truworths International Ltd  1  
52 UCS Group Ltd   2 
53 Value Group Ltd  1  
54 Woolworths Holdings Ltd 1 2  
55 Zarara Energy Ltd   1 
 Total number of announcements 15 28 38 
 Total rand value of announcements R10 113 405 280 R37 398 506 522 R25 509 646 866 
 
  
